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INTRODUCTION 
   Since World War II multilateral negotiation represents a main instrument to 
build, and to sustain, the multitude of international regimes that have strongly 
contributed to the stability of the international system. A common assessment 
is that the success of regime-building processes has been conditioned by the 
leadership of the United States (Kindlebergr, 1973). According to this view 
Washington has taken the initiative to start most of the significant international 
regime-building processes concerning military as well as non-military matters. 
American policy-makers and diplomats have repeatedly led negotiations to a 
successful outcome. US political power has been a prerequisite for the effective 
implementation of numerous international agreements. Therefore, an alarming 
observation is that in recent years the US role as the natural lender in many 
multilateral negotiations has become increasingly questioned, including 
amongst the American political elite itself. Both the willingness and the capacity 
of Washington to steer negotiations towards a constructive agreement has 
allegedly diminished, perhaps to a dangerously low level (Keohane, 1980).
   Since the arrival of the Reagan Administration in Washington in the early 
1980's the US attitude towards multilateral institutions has grown increasingly 
critical and has become more and more concerned with short term benefits. 
Washington has seemingly grown less and less willing to make costly political or 
economic investments in order to develop international collective goods. One 
manifestation of this increasingly national policy-orientation has been the 
withdrawal from certain UN institutions like, for instance, UNESCO. Other 
evidence has been the notable change of US diplomatic behavior from offensive 
leadership to a more cautious and defensive posture in important multilateral 
processes of negotiation (Imber, 1989; Ahnlid, 1996; Hart, 1995). 
   Two cases that will be examined in this essay are the last multilateral 
negotiation under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
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(GATT) --the Uruguay Round- -and the current multilateral talks concerning 
Climate Change. In both cases the absence or presence of American leadership 
has strongly influenced the process. The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) started in 
a fashion that immediately recalled earlier negotiations in GATT. The United 
States played an important leading role in initiating these new multilateral trade 
talks. Likewise, Washington performed a major part in setting the agenda and 
directing the negotiation towards an outcome that would reinforce the 
international trade regime. However, when the Uruguay negotiations reached 
their endgame around 1989 the US role in the process had changed dramatically. 
Instead of acting as a determined leader the US now performed more like a 
process broker (Sjostedt, 1993 ; Zartman, 1994). The issue of financial services 
offers a good example. This was one of the topics that Washington had 
promoted the strongest in the early stages of the Uruguay Round. In the 
endgame the US had, in contrast, become virtually isolated in its insistence on 
fair trade stipulations (specific reciprocity)- a position that was clearly in 
contradiction to the fundamental GATT principle of non-discrimination which 
Washington had evoked with such conviction when the agenda for the Uruguay 
Round was set about ten years earlier (Ahnlid, 1996). The considerable influence 
of the United States prevented rather than promoted an agreement.
   Similarly, in the global negotiations on Climate Warming the US has 
recently performed more like a broker than as a leader. Washington has refused 
to make firm commitments to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere ; a position which is largely explained by the strong dependence of 
the US economy on the production, sales or consumption of fossil fuels (Deland, 
1991). The official argument for the US stance has been that existing scientific 
knowledge about climate warming and its consequences remains insufficient to 
motivate the extremely costly measures, which are required to reduce green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere to a satisfactory level. This US 
position has led the climate negotiations into an impasse, No other country, 
or group of nations, has been able to break this deadlock (Hart, 1995; Michel, 
1996).
   For the academic analyst of international affairs faltering US leadership in 
contemporary multilateral processes has not been a complete surprise, Already 
in the 1970's a debate developed concerning what was then called the problem of 
hegemonic stability, that the preservation of an open- -liberal- -world economic-
political system required that it was continuously defended and supported by a 
dominant Great Power. The oil crisis of 1973 had been a stark indication that
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American international dominance of the world economic/political system was 
threatened. An assessment of selected indicators confirmed that US issue-
specific power in areas like trade, investment or energy was indeed diminishing 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977, Krasner, 1991). At the same time there were no indi-
cations that the EU, Japan or any other nation would replace the US as a 
hegemon in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the theory of collective goods 
also predicted that cooperation between a small number of Great Powers- -e. g. 
the US; the EU and Japan-could not easily substitute for the leadership 
provided by a single hegemon (Olson, 1965),
   Leaning on the theory of collective goods and related thinking on coalition-
building a number of authors have asserted that the gradual decline of US 
hegemony represents a mounting threat to international, liberal regimes. The 
gist of the argument is that the persuasion of a hegemon is needed to make a 
sufficiently great number of governments forego short-term gains in order to 
attain more important long term benefits derived from the collective goods 
generated by global regimes. Only a hegemon would be forceful enough to keep 
potential free riders in line. No other state than a hegemon would be willing to 
accrue the costs necessary for the management and policing of liberal regimes 
(Gilpin, 1987; Lake, 1988; Baldwin, 1993).
   If the above assessment of the changing international power distribution is 
correct the prospect for future global cooperation and regime operation in areas 
like trade, finance, monetary affairs or the environment is now growing 
increasingly grim. Regime implementation in individual countries will de-
teriorate. Participants of multilateral processes of negotiation will find it more 
and more difficult to reach meaningful agreements. The main question 
addressed in this essay is whether there are any conceivable, realistic remedies 
for the suggested problems of leadership in multilateral talks. The objective of 
the study is, however, not to try to answer this query comprehensively but only 
to elucidate it with the help of one particular theoretical approach, which may be 
referred to as role analysis.
   The typical study of hegemonic stability pertained to the system level of 
analysis and was primarily concerned with changes of structural power. The 
functions of the hegemon in international cooperation were only conceived of in 
very general terms. The particular context of inter-state negotiation was not 
explicitly considered. The focus was set particularly on the implementation of
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international treaties and the crucial mission of the hegemon to serve as an 
international "ranger" in this regard. This question has lately been extensively 
discussed in the rapidly growing literature on the implementation of inter-
national treaties (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Leadership in regime-building 
through negotiation remains a much more neglected subject which has seldom 
been discussed in depth. An important exception is the conceptual analysis by 
Arild Underdal in one of the very few theory-oriented books dealing with 
multilateral negotiation, International Multilateral Negotiation. Approaches to the 
Management of Complexity edited by William Zartman (Zartman, 1994). The 
Underdal seminal article draws from the organization-focused literature on 
leadership and demonstrates its high relevance for the analysis of multilateral 
negotiation. Underdal introduces a useful theoretical outlook on multilateral 
leadership. He proposes a demand-supply perspective which emphasizes the 
importance of the interaction between leader and follower in the dynamics of 
leadership. A distinction is made between different modes of leadership, such as 
coercive and instrumental leadership, "While coercion basically comes down to 
imposing one actor's preferences on some other(s) or preventing others from 
doing so to others, instrumental leadership is essentially a matter of finding 
means to achieve common goals" (Underdal, 1994, p. 187). Finally, the theo-
retical framework developed by Arild Underdal indicates useful approaches for 
the identification of the positive conditions for leadership (Ibid. ).
   The Underdal approach to multilateral leadership represents the basic, 
theoretical point of departure for the present study. However, this framework 
needs to become extended and further elaborated in order to better clarify the 
key question of this study : what is required by a state--or an international 
organization- -striving to perform a leadership role in a multilateral negotiation? 
The essential objective of the Underdal essay was to argue for the usefulness of 
a leadership perspective in the study of multilateral negotiation. For this reason 
his theoretical categories are general and do not directly permit the deter-
mination of exactly what kinds of action performed by influential actors in 
multilateral negotiation manifest leadership as distinguished from other types of 
state behavior. The method chosen to address this analytical problem is to 
conceive of leadership as a role, which a particular country or organization can 
- -or cannot- -perform in a given negotiation. Role is understood as a recurrent 
pattern of behavior of states or organizations participating in a negotiation which can 
be attributed a distinct meaning in the process. For example, a state or organiza-
tion may perform the role of mediator. In this case "the recurrent pattern of 
behavior" would be "--(the) direct conduct of negotiation between parties at
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issue on the vast proposals made by the mediator".' The " distinct meaning" of 
this "recurrent pattern of behavior" identifying the mediator role is that an 
attempt is made to narrow, or bridge, the gap between differing proposals or 
positions expressing contention between two or more other parties. 
   One objective of this study is to clarify what is typical for "the recurrent 
pattern of behavior" associated with the performance of a leadership role in a 
multilateral process of negotiation. In this exploratory analysis the Uruguay 
Round and the global negotiations on Climate Change will serve as empirical 
reference cases. A second objective of the study is to discuss the necessary 
conditions for the performance of a leadership role, or rather how these terms are 
to be specified by means of research. 
THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: 
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
   Arild Underdal offers a general definition of leadership, which represents a 
suitable point of departure also for this study : "- -(A)n asymmetrical relation of 
influence in which one actor guides or directs the behavior of others toward a 
certain goal over a certain period of time" (Underdal, 1994, p. 178 and footnote 1). 
An actor providing leadership to a process of multilateral negotiation may 
present itself "at the table" as the representative of a nation or of an international 
organization. Manifest leadership may express itself in various ways as 
indicated by Underdal's distinction between differing "modes of leadership". 
Hence, leadership may on some occasions manifest itself as sanctions or other 
types of coercive power. In other situations leadership corresponds to the 
development and management of a relationship of cooperation. However, 
leadership in operation always means that the performance of targeted actors 
engaged in the negotiation are guided in the direction of a final agreement. 
   Although the general meaning of Underdal's definition of leadership is quite 
clear it has to be specified in certain respects to serve as criterion for the 
identification of "patterns of behavior" indicating that a particular actor is 
performing a leadership role. Sometimes the performance of a leadership role is 
highly visible, because it is part of the formal organizational structure, which has 
been set up to support a multilateral negotiation. For example, in the European 
Union the Commission has been given the prerogative to take initiatives to start
1 Part of definition of mediation given in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (1964), (editors : 
 Glould, J & Kolb, W), London : Tavistock Publishers 
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decision-making-which is largely the same as negotiation-on all matters to be 
processed in the EU institutions (Gould & Kolb, 1964). Other international 
Secretariats have competencies similar to those possessed by the European 
Commission, although they are much weaker from a formal, legal point of view. 
For example, the Executive Bodies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank have a relatively strong position in negotiations involving 
these Institutions ("Sisters in the Wook-", 1991). Multilateral negotiations are 
usually conducted within a system of formal negotiation bodies. Sometimes 
these institutions may be temporary and dismantled when an agreement has 
been reached but they may also represent permanent international organiza-
tions. The Chairs of formal negotiation bodies are given a sort of leadership role. 
Hence, a major task of the Chair is to organize the work of the respective 
conference or committee and also to steer debate or bargaining in the committee. 
The competence and skill of the Chair may represent the difference between 
success and failure in a negotiating body. The leadership of the Chair, or of other 
conference officers, may vary considerably with respect to form as well as to 
sources of authority. Hence, Lance Antrim makes a distinction between 
inspirational, procedural and substantive leadership (Antrim, 1994).
   Leadership roles are, however, not necessarily formalized. Indeed, in 
multilateral negotiations critical consultations take place in informal groups 
entirely outside the formal organization of the multilateral negotiation. Indeed, 
such informal discussions often involve only the most influential countries and 
concern the most sensitive or important matters. Leadership, particularly the 
instrumental and cooperative variety, is often practiced by means of types of 
actions, which may also be carried out by states that no not have a leader role in 
the process. Thus, marry actions which in reality represent the performance of 
a leadership role are not formally acknowledged as such and may therefore be 
difficult to identify. A basic indicator is that leadership actions have one thing 
in common regardless of their form : they all represent, or generate, influence of one 
actor on others. However, influence is not the same as leadership. All nations 
taking active part in a multilateral negotiation are striving to influence its 
outcome and the various forces in the process forming it. Many poor and weak 
states are still virtually powerless in complex, multilateral negotiations. 
Nevertheless, some small nations are, no doubt, successful in exercising some 
influence regarding some issue at least at some point during the negotiation. For 
most countries this influence is, however, strongly limited. Small and weak 
states are typically forced to focus on one or maybe a few issues of particular 
concern for them. For example, in the GAIT rounds many poor developing
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countries concentrated all or most of their attention on the Negotiating Group on 
Tropical Products. Some of them were able to generate a certain amount of 
influence in this particular context. This influence was, however, not only 
relatively weak but also pertained to an issue area, that was comparatively 
peripheral in the process. Nations with a principal interest in Tropical Products 
were likely to be Followers rather than Leaders in the GATT talks (Hudec, 1988; 
Winham, 1986). Potential leaders are presumably to be found only amongst 
countries with a capacity to significantly influence developments in all, or at 
least many, Negotiation Groups.
   Thus, influence is a prerequisite but not a sufficient condition for a 
leadership role. In order to represent leadership influence has to meet a number 
of qualifying conditions:'
1. Cause of influential action. Leadership requires something more than inci-
   dental influence. Leadership is based on calculated actions aimed to drive 
   the process of negotiation in a desired direction. 
2. Continuity of influential action. A strong leader of a multilateral 
  negotiation should be able to guide the whole process from initiation to 
   agreement. However, leadership may be exercised by a certain actor only 
   during limited stages of the negotiation. 
3. Purpose of influential action. Defining leadership in multilateral talks Arild 
   Underdal states that "-the leader exercise(s) -positive influence, guiding 
   rather than vetoing, collective action. Thus, leadership is associated with the 
   collective pursuit of some common good or joint purpose" (Underdal, 1994, p. 
   178), Accordingly, actions by an actor which disrupt or stop a negotiation do 
   not represent leadership even if their impact on the process is great and this 
   effects deliberately designed. The search for manifestations or a leadership 
   role should concentrate on actions by states, organization or other actors 
   that tend to facilitate the negotiation or otherwise pave the way for a final 
   agreement. 
4. The scope of influence. Leadership action may be directed towards indi-
   vidual parties. However, typical and special for leadership is the simul-
   taneous impact on several parties. Ultimately, leadership action has a process 
   impact ; it has consequences for the process as whole.
2 These conditions need to be clarified by means of research. The propositions in the 
 should be regarded as indicative and hypothetical.
text
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   A summary of the observations above is that the role of leadership is 
manifested by non-incidental actions of states or organizations, which have an 
intended, beneficial process impact and which are not isolated to a particular 
event. Such actions may be framed in highly different ways depending, for 
example, on the influencing method chosen by the actor performing as a leader; 
coercion or instrumental cooperation. The prevailing external conditions also 
matter. In this regard the character of the negotiation process itself is of particular 
significance. As pointed out by William Zartman the essence of multi-party 
negotiation is the "management of complexity" pertaining to issues as well as the 
number of actors involved (Zartman, 1994). These circumstances make it 
necessary for negotiating parties to deal with issues in several different ways 
before an agreement can be concluded. In fact, the multilateral process may be 
broken up into a number of stages recurring in every negotiation, each of which 
is characterized by a particular kind of state interaction. Agenda-setting begins 
with the initiation of the process of parties summoned to the negotiation table 
for the task of coping with a certain problem or problem area. Further phases of 
agenda-setting specify what topics are going to be negotiated, and how these 
issues are going to be defined and approached in the negotiation. Often general 
goals for the negotiation are established simultaneously, as well as an organiza-
tional structure. Formula refers to the choice of a specific approach to problem-
solving and agreement. Detail means bargaining over specific and limited issues 
usually within the constraints of the formula. Finally, termination brings the 
whole process to an end with the conclusion of a final agreement (Zartman & 
Berman, 1982 & Hampson with Hart, 1995, p. 25-28).
   Process stages presumably represent different conditions for state diplo-
macy in general as well as for leadership action. For example, agenda-setting in 
multilateral negotiations is typically characterized by the gathering of infor-
mation, problem analysis and extensive communication between negotiation 
parties. In contrast, negotiation on detail is likely to occur in a relatively closed 
process in which parties focus on highly specified issues and exchange 
concessions. These stark differences of process character mean that a leader 
wanting to move or terminate the negotiation needs to employ different means 
of influence in different process stages.
SUMMARY CASE DESCRIPTIONS
   The Uruguay Found and the negotiation on Climate Change have been 
included in the study because they are both illustrative as well as problematic as
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seen in a leadership perspective. The two processes are genuinely multilateral as 
each of them involve at lease 150 different actors (states as well as international 
organizations), The complexity of the agenda represents an important challenge 
for countries striving for leadership which is typical for regime-building at the 
close of the 20th Century. Agenda and process complexity was further enhanced 
because many issues were politically highly controversial. Finally, both cases 
contain elements of successful leadership as well as leadership failure. 
Accordingly, these two multilateral talks should represent prolific references for 
an exploratory case study focusing on the mechanics of, as well as the conditions 
for, an effective leadership role.
I. The case of multilateral trade negotiations 
   The Uruguay Round was formally opened at a Ministerial Meeting under 
the auspices of GATT in September 1986 in Punta del Este outside Montevi-
deo.' This conference of trade ministers had been preceded by several years of 
informal as well as formal pre-negotiations, which had been initiated by the 
United States. However, the agenda of the forthcoming Uruguay Round was to 
a considerable degree conditioned by the outcome of earlier multilateral trade 
negotiations in GATT, and especially the Tokyo round that was terminated in 
1979. One main issue of the pre-negotiations of the Uruguay Round was if new 
GATT negotiations were necessary. Another principal question was whether 
the upcoming negotiations should deal with a number of new trade issues that 
had hitherto not been covered by GATT, trade in services, intellectual property 
rights and foreign direct investment. A large group of Developing Countries 
opposed this proposal. A number of formal compromises were needed to solve 
these problems. For example, for all practical purposes services became part of 
the agenda but was formally kept outside the GATT context. The agenda also 
included the whole spectrum of traditional GATT issues, tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade. The organization set up to handle the negotiation consisted of 
about fifteen Negotiation Groups and two decision making councils for 
horizontal issues, one of which was particularly concerned with services. About 
two years were dedicated to issue clarification and technical problem-solving, 
before substantive talks got under way. The general objective for the 
negotiation was to increase international market access on equal competitive 
terms by reducing various kinds of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, During
3 For a summary descriptions of the Uruguay Round see, for example, Hampson with Hart, 
 1995, Sjostedt, 1994, Winham & Kizer, 1993; and GATT Activities
129
Gunnar Sjostedt
the process the GATT Secretariat gave substantial collective technical support 
to negotiation parties. Negotiations could be terminated in 1990 as scheduled in 
the formal plan for the Uruguay Round. The Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, 
intended to conclude the trade talks, managed only to settle some of the 
remaining negotiation problems. Binding liberalization commitments with 
regard to agricultural goods and services represented two of the most difficult 
areas. After Brussels followed four years of protracted negotiation characterized 
by relative stalemate. The various attempts that were made to undo the impasse 
were only marginally successful. A principal reason why a settlement was 
eventually reached was probably that a failure of the Uruguay Round would 
have threatened the credibility of the whole GATT regime. Issue complexity 
contributed to delay a successful end of the Uruguay negotiations. However, the 
main stumbling blocs were of a political nature. The North-South conflict of 
interest was a constant undercurrent of the process. The dispute between the US 
and the EU pertaining to a large part of the agenda was crucial. As long as 
Brussels and Washington could not settle their differences it was impossible to 
conclude the Uruguay Round with a constructive agreement. The transforma-
tion of GATT into WTO-the World Trade Organization-represented a sort of 
general face-saving device that facilitated the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
The case of climate change negotiations
   Negotiations on climate change originated from alarming reports from the 
international scientific community.' The first pre-negotiations were organized 
by authoritative elements of the international scientific community. Some 
analysts would argue that the start of the negotiations on climate warming was 
the result of a successful operation of a powerful "epistemic community". One 
very early beginning of the pre-negotiations was the major Climate Change 
research project that was launched by the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) in the mid-1970's (Michel, 1996, p. 5). Another step forward in 
the process was the 1979 First World Climate Conference organized by UNEP in 
collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Analytical 
work highlighted in the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) was 
also important in the processes of collective learning purting Climate Change on 
the international agenda generally (Ibid. ). A Scientific Committee on the
4 The description of the case of Climate Change draws heavily from Michel, 1996. 
 eral descriptions see Hart, 1995 and Houghton et al, 1990.
For other gen-
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Problems of the Environment, set up by ICSU, UNEP and WMO indicated an 
increasingly sharper focus for the international discussions on Climate Change. 
The Final Document of the Villach Conference organized by the Scientific 
Committee stated that there was a need for a global convention addressing 
Climate Change (Ibid., p. 6).
   When more organized consultations on Climate Change got under way they 
unfolded on three different tracks ; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework 
Convention for Climate Change (INC) and the United Nations Conference On 
Environment and Development (UNCED). UNEP and WMO jointly created IPCC 
in 1988. Organized in three Committees the task of IPCC was to analyze the 
climate problem as such, to identify its social, economic and other consequences 
and to assess appropriate responses. Particularly, the Science report produced 
by the world scientific community had a great impact and paved the way for the 
creation of INC, which was established by the UN General Assembly in 
December 1990 (Resolution 45/212). INC was a more traditional negotiation 
body than IPCC, as participating nations were represented by diplomats and 
experts from the capitals. The task given to INC was to negotiate a convention 
on Climate Change to be finally accepted at the UNCED Summit meeting in Rio 
de Janeiro in June 1992. Climate was part of the agenda of UNCED, but was not 
really negotiated in preparatory process. Still, developments in UNCED 
probably had a noteworthy impact on the Climate negotiations in INC. Through 
the comparatively transparent UNCED process climate warning, as well as other 
environmental problems, were highlighted in the eyes of large elements of the 
general public. The attention given to Climate Change in the media as well as in 
a great number of Non-Governmental Organizations put some pressure on 
negotiators in INC.
   The Framework Agreement for Climate Change, that was signed in 1992 has 
sometimes been regarded as a failure as it did not contain binding commitments 
by signatory governments to cut their emissions of C02 or other greenhouse 
gases. The Framework Agreement was more like a platform for continued 
negotiation on Climate warming. The main accomplishment of the Framework 
Agreement was to identify the elements of a future, viable Climate Convention. 
Discussions in INC after the Rio Meeting have not yet moved negotiating parties 
to make pledges with regard to emissions of C02. However, the first formal 
Meeting of the Parties to the Framework Agreement in Berlin 1995 designed a 
concrete plan for the reduction of greenhouse gases that is meant to be
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confirmed at their next meeting in Kyoto, Japan. 
LEADERSHIP ACTIVITIES IN THE CASE STUDY NEGOTIATIONS: 
AN EXPLORATORY INVENTORY5
   A conclusive study of how a particular actor performs as a leader in a 
multilateral negotiation has to take into account that external conditions for 
such a role may vary considerably between process stages. One implication is 
that the methods of influence governments use are likely to differ across process 
stages. Another likely consequence is that the relative capacity of a country to 
perform a leadership role may likewise differ from one process stage to another. 
A critical element of a capacity for effective leadership may be the capability to 
easily change leadership methods and style as the negotiation process unfolds. 
Leadership studies should, therefore, be comprehensive and include the entire 
negotiation process. However, the exploratory nature of this investigation 
motivates a somewhat simplified version of this approach. The two cases of 
multilateral negotiation will be looked into through three windows of analysis 
each of which represents a separate process stage. The first "window" focuses on 
agenda-setting including "initiation", a phase of the negotiation that might have 
been considered to make up a process stage of its own. The second and third win-
dows pertains to negotiation for formula and endgame bargaining respectively,
First Window of Analysis : Agenda setting 
   In the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations the United States 
played a crucial leadership role with regard to initiation and agenda-setting, Like 
in earlier GATT rounds an important element of initiation diplomacy was 
consultations organized and led by Washington within an initially small but 
eventually growing group of key trading nations. Hence, US initiation diplo-
macy first concentrated on talks with the EU and Japan, and then involved other 
significant trading nations like Canada before discussions became multi-
lateralized. This early phase of agenda-setting terminated in 1984/85 with a
5 The analysis of leadership activities is based on the above descriptions of the two cases. 
 Furthermore, the analysis is also based on data which have been gathered in two still un-
 reported research projects, in which the author is currently involved. One project concerns 
 the processes that changed the GATT into the WTO. The project is carried out in collabora-
 tion between the Swedish Institute of International Affaire and the Swedish universities in 
 Lund and Umea. The second project is a joint effort of the Swedish Institute of International 
 Affairs and the universities of Uppsala and Umcd in Sweden and the Johns Hopkins Universi-
 ty in Washington D, C. The project analyses international, environmental governance, Michel, 
 1996 has been produced within this project.
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general call for participation in a Preparatory Committee set up to organize the 
future Ministerial Meeting in Punta del Este. The invitation was directed to 
members of the GATT regime, Contracting Parties and Observers.6 
   The process of coalition-building with like-minded countries supporting a 
new GATT round was substantially bolstered with technical argumentation 
concerning the need to reinforce the international trade regime. Knowledge and 
current information about the status of the system to carry this diplomatic 
argumentation was largely available within the highly competent ministries and 
central agencies shaping the American trade policy. However coalition-building 
was also dependent on the production and dissemination of new consensual 
knowledge, particularly related to the so-called new trade issues, services trade 
as well trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and direct investments 
(TRIMS). Economic scientific knowledge (or acknowledged theory) was needed 
to demonstrate, first, that new issues had a genuine character of international 
trade and, second, that they could be integrated into the GATT legal framework.
   Thus, one important element of US leadership action targeting like-minded 
countries, primarily the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), was to initiate and coordinate knowledge-building 
and issue analysis regarding relevant trade matters in these nations. OECD itself 
had an important role to perform in this context, particularly in the earliest 
phases of agenda-setting. When the pre-negotiations for the Uruguay Round 
started, a large coalition of Developing Countries successfully opposed the 
inclusion of the so-called new trade issues, and especially services trade, in the 
GATT framework. Therefore, OECD represented an important instrument for 
coordination and exchange of information amongst Industrialized Countries.
   Another important element of US leadership strategy in agenda-setting was 
to try to break down the loose coalition of developing countries resisting the 
introduction of the new issues and, for that reason, obstructing the planning for 
a new GATT round. In this regard conventional, bilateral diplomacy probably 
had an important part to play. This kind of diplomatic intercourse largely took 
place outside the GATT context. However, once an organizational structure was 
established to serve the pre-negotiations for the Uruguay Round this institution 
became an important arena for the struggle between those countries that
6 An observer country was not fully integrated into the GATT regime. It could either repre-
 sent a country incapable of honoring all the obligation of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
 and Trade or countries that were still in the process of becoming Contracting Parties.
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favored a new GATT round and those that did not, the so-called "dissidents". In 
this diplomatic game one of the main issues was whether the so-called new trade 
issues (services, TRIPS and TRIMS) could be negotiated in the GATT. Legal 
argumentation based on references to the GATT treaty was an important 
component of the argumentation brought forward at the negotiation table by 
the dissidents that were informally led by Brazil and India. The dissemination of 
new economic-scientific knowledge demonstrating that the new issues did 
indeed pertain to the issue area of trade was an important instrument to weaken 
the legal position on which the dissident negotiation strategy was based. The US 
had a leading role in undermining the "dissident" position. 
   The establishment of the Preparatory Committee preparing for Punta del 
Este was a clear sign that the "dissidents" were not strong enough to veto, or 
deter, a new GATT round. The proceedings at the Ministerial Meeting in 
Uruguay demonstrated that the leading developing countries were much more 
assertive and influential than they had been in any earlier GATT round.? 
However, the outcome of Punta del Este also established that the coalition of 
developed countries, which at this point was still led by the United States, also 
prevailed in the important dispute concerning the "new trade issues", as they 
were included in the agenda for the forthcoming Uruguay Round. At the same 
time the result of Punta del Este also demonstrated that the "dissidents" had real 
political clout as special procedural and institutional arrangements had to be 
made for the new issues. Thus, the agreement made at Punta del Este accepted 
liberalization negotiations on trade in services and the other new trade issues. 
However, the same agreement also stipulated that these talks should be kept 
separate from the negotiations on goods and for that reason be conducted in 
special negotiating bodies that were formally not part of the GATT system. The 
underlying meaning of these procedural rules was that the results of the 
multilateral negotiations on the new trade issues could not he automatically 
included in the GATT legal system.
   The United States continued its role of crucial leadership also after Punta del 
Este, although under slightly new and more favorable conditions. Once the 
formal decision had been taken to start the Uruguay Round negotiations were 
transferred to Geneva and for all practical purposes also to GATT. Negotiations 
were soon conducted within an elaborate network of formal institutions 
including specialized Negotiating Groups for all issue areas including the "new
7 In the two earlier multilateral negotiations, the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, developing 
 countries had been virtually excluded from initiation and agenda-setting negotiations.
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trade issues", that were formally negotiated outside GATT. A Chairperson was 
selected for each of these bodies with a mandate to manage and procedurally 
direct negotiation. The Ministerial Declaration signed at Punta del Este included 
general objectives and a fairly specified frame of reference for the forthcoming 
negotiations. Activities related to agenda-setting continued within this frame-
work for some time after Punta del Esa. This work was to a large extent man-
aged and guided by individuals representing the formal negotiation organi-
zation, Secretariat officials and committee chairpersons. For example, the 
chairperson established a work program and a schedule for his-or her-
committee and watched over its implementation. The GATT Secretariat rec-
orded the discussions held at committee sessions, provided necessary back-
ground information to the committee work process and at some points, and with 
regard to some issues, also summarized the positions taken by individual 
negotiating parties.
   The contributions of committee chairpersons and the GATT Secretariat to 
the process of agenda-setting clearly facilitated the negotiation process. 
However, although this influence evidently was quite significant it did not 
represent genuine leadership as it was constrained, indeed controlled, by 
negotiating parties. The influence of the GATT Secretariat in the negotiation 
process is easily underestimated. Nevertheless, the Secretariat was not per-
mitted to take any initiative of its own. In principle, the support provided by the 
Secretariat was invariably the result of work commissioned by negotiating 
parties. Formally, committee chairpersons may appear to have had more leeway 
than Secretariat officials but in reality their political room of manoeuvre was 
very narrow. Everything a chairperson did to influence the negotiation process 
needed approval by negotiating parties.
   The direction of agenda-setting and issue clarification was primarily given 
by the interaction of negotiation parties participating in the Uruguay Round. 
State contributions to this process were essentially of two different types, 
submission of prepared papers or oral statements "at the table". The inter-
ventions made by individual participants varied considerably depending on 
issue, countries involved or external conditions. However, altogether state 
submissions constituted a certain pattern. The work in the Negotiation Groups 
was driven by proposals put forward by a few leading countries and particularly 
the EU and the US. The submissions of these countries framed agenda-setting 
discussions. Other countries made proposals that added information, clarified 
arguments or suggested compromise solutions to conflicts of interest regarding
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minor issues. However, all these interventions were ultimately motivated, 
constrained by the submissions made by the Great Powers.
and
   The creation, dissemination and employment of science-based consensual 
knowledge was of critical importance also in the initiation of the global 
negotiations on climate Change. The role and significance of the scientific 
community was quite different than it had been in the of the Uruguay Round. In 
the latter case theory-oriented academic economists had contributed to facilitate 
the definition of the new issues (services, TRIPS, and TRIMS) as trade. However, 
in the Uruguay Round national governments had controlled pre-negotiations 
and given them their direction. The Climate negotiations had been initiated and 
driven by elements of the international scientific community supported by a few 
international organizations concerned with environmental issues. 
   At first the international talks about the need for a climate convention were 
highly fragmented and developed in several countries. These discussions can be 
traced back to 1957-1958, the International Geophysical Year (Michel, p. 2). The 
Climate issue was on the agenda of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment but did generate any particular political action. However, the UN 
Environmental Program (UNEP) -a result of the Stockholm Conference-
immediately became strongly engaged in the problem area of climate change. 
One manifestation of this interest on the part of UNEP was the research 
programs related to Climate Change and the First World Climate Conference in 
1979 organized jointly with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).
   Together with the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) UNEP 
and WMO provided important elements of leadership to the early, and still 
informal, pre-negotiations related to Climate Change. More resources were 
allocated to research on the causes and consequences of Climate Warming. The 
organizations supplied instruments for the coordination of research. They also 
contributed to concentrate the focus of international consultations. As UNEP 
and WMO are intergovernmental organizations they also represented an 
interface for the communication between the research community and policy-
makers at the national or international level, The Scientific Committee on the 
Problems on the Environment, sponsored by ICSU, UNEP and WMO, was a 
concrete manifestation of the organizational support to the scientific 
community. Eventually, in 1988 these efforts resulted in the creation of a special 
forum for international discussions about the Climate problem involving 
national governments ; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
created by UNEP and WMO.
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   At the end of the 1880's national governments had become increasingly 
involved in the international talks about Climate Change. For example, in 
several countries governments organized or sponsored policy-oriented confer-
ences on this topic. The general purpose of such seminars was typically to 
highlight the seriousness of the Climate problem and assess its causes and 
effects. One important consequence of the establishment of IPCC was that it 
organized, formalized and multilateralized international consultations on 
Climate Change. For example, the three committees of IPCC dealing with 
scientific assessment, consequences of greenhouse gas emissions and responses 
respectively had chairpersons selected on the basis of nationality. The work of 
IPCC mobilized political support for the Climate issue outside this institution. 
One notable example is the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric 
Pollution and Climate Change in 1989 organized by the Dutch government. The 
conference involving 66 countries recommended that developed countries 
stabilize their CO2 emissions as soon as possible. The Noordwijk meeting was a 
sort of Summit meeting on the Climate issue with 24 developed and developing 
countries, and it had been organized by the governments of three particularly 
interested countries, France, the Netherlands and Norway.
   With IPCC solidly engaged in the Climate pre-negotiations, several 
governments undertook various measures to build up support for the formal 
negotiations on a future Climate convention. However, it seems that no nation, 
or group of countries, performed as a leader in this early stages of the process. 
The outcome of the review of the work of IPCC, that took place in 1990, is clearly 
indicative in this regard. At this point only the committee responsible for the 
scientific assessment of the problem of Climate Change as such had produced 
significant results. The authority of the IPCC's scientific assessment was due to 
the fact that it had been produced by an interdisciplinary and competent world 
scientific community. By confirming that climate warming is a real problem 
with the help of scientific models and facts IPCC produced a strong motive for 
negotiations on this topic, that recalcitrant countries found difficult to resist. At 
the same time the IPCC models implicitly more or less determined the agenda for 
the anticipated negotiations. IPCC provided a clear focus for the negotiations 
and provided carefully developed negotiation concepts (e. g greenhouse gases or 
sinks). It also very clearly indicated a negotiation approach, the reduction of 
emissions of, and sinks for, identified greenhouse gases. Agenda-setting had 
functioned as a learning process with scientists as "senders" and policy-makers 
as "receivers".
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Second Window of Analysis : Formula negotiations 
   A classic feature of the GATT rounds has been formula negotiations 
concerning linear-across-the-board-reduction of tariffs on goods. The for-
mula was needed to manage a highly problematic negotiation problem-how to 
coordinate and multilateralize the results of bilateral talks between particular 
significant trading nations with regard to a particular issue. The formula served 
as a kind of collective negotiation strategy determining general objectives (e. g 
average 50% cuts) taking the main concerns of principal parties of negotiation 
into consideration. Hence, in the case of tariff negotiations in GATT some 
countries were concerned about the height of existing tariff walls as well as tariff 
disparities. Such a linear tariff formula had been tried out unsuccessfully in the 
so-called Dillon Round in 1960, and was developed and applied in the Kennedy 
Pound (1964-1967), and further elaborated and refined In the Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979). When the linear tariff formula was introduced into the Uruguay 
negotiation it was accepted with little negotiation which, furthermore, only 
related to various details. In contrast, formula negotiations became politically 
difficult and technically complex in several other issue areas,. especially those 
concerning trade in agricultural goods and the so-called new trade issues 
(services, intellectual property rights and trade-related investments). In most 
issue areas formula negotiations in the Uruguay Round involved several, or even 
many, countries, and sometimes also a few international organizations. For 
example, a model used to compare and aggregate different types of subsidies, 
which had originally been developed in the OECD, represented an important 
input into the formula discussions in the agricultural area. In several important 
issue areas, for example, agriculture and services trade, different approaches to a 
formula were supported by the competing industrial Great Powers. Usually, the 
EU and the US confronted each other in these particular negotiations. For 
example, in the early agenda-setting negotiations the US still strived for 
unconditional liberalization, such as the elimination of government regulations 
effecting trade flows. The EU approach was to separate regulations into 
separate categories, and to distinguish between trade-effecting regulations that 
were legitimate and those that were not.
   The pattern of state interaction unfolding in the formula negotiations was 
similar to how actors had performed when coping with agenda-setting. 
Committee chairpersons continued to organize negotiation work and to lead 
diplomatic exchange at the table. Likewise, chairpersons recurrently facilitated 
dispute settlement in the negotiation process by means of inter-sessional 
consultations. Secretariat support, in the form of circulated protocols from
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formal meetings and recurrently revised negotiated texts, were seemingly 
indispensable. Country submissions produced ideas for technical problem-
solving and clarified the controversial political issues, as will as clarifying the 
positions taken by individual states or coalitions active in the process. However, 
in the formula negotiations the main moving force in the Uruguay process 
continued to be the exchange of major proposals tabled by a few Great Powers. 
The interaction between the EU and the US was especially important in this 
regard. However, also some other actors like Japan and Canada contributed to 
frame the formula negotiation and in this sense also lead the diplomatic game. 
The identity of leading actors varied somewhat across issue areas and included 
individual states as well as coalitions of nations. For example, in the agricultural 
sector the coalition of free traders called the CAIRNS group belonged to the 
small number of actors contributing to drive the process.
   The Framework Agreement for Climate Change of 1992 may be regarded as 
an official, negotiated formula for continued negotiations in this area. The 
countries particularly concerned with the problem of climate warming had 
wanted to reach an agreement with binding commitments by developed 
countries to begin reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. When it remained 
very unlikely that such an accord could be made before the UNCED meeting in 
Rio de Janeiro the Framework Agreement was developed to serve another long 
term objective, that is, to establish viable guidelines for how the future talks to 
reach an agreement on emissions should be conducted. Thus, the Framework 
Agreement identified the various elements that should have to be included in an 
effective convention regarding Climate Change. It also represented a basic 
commitment, negotiated in earnest as a way to reduce greenhouse concentra-
tions in the atmosphere.
   The Framework agreement was negotiated between 102 countries at five 
sessions of INC, taking place in the period February 1991-May 1992. The 
principal actors of the process were national delegations, the ad-hoc INC 
Secretariat and the elected conference officers, Chairs of the Conference and of 
Working Groups. The diplomatic interaction at, and around, the table in the INC 
process had certain characteristics similar to those of manifested in the Uruguay 
Round. With the large part of the procedural questions settled at the first INC 
session (in Chantilly, Virginia, 4-14 February 1991), delegations started to 
present precise proposals for a negotiation formula at the second session of INC. 
It has been reported that 16 delegations contributed formal proposals to this 
debate on formula. It seems that three main approaches dominated this debate
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and gave direction to the negotiation process. The EU argued for specific 
commitments to stabilize CO emissions. Japan offered a plan for "pledge and 
review". The idea was that each particular state should make an individual 
pledge to reduce C02 emissions to a certain degree during a certain period of 
time. The implementation of these pledges should be reviewed internationally 
according to the Japanese proposition.
   A UK-US paper was tabled with a proposal for a "phased comprehensive 
approach" including a formula for a trade off between measures concerning 
emissions and sinks respectively. India, supported by other developing coun-
tries, activated the issue of financial compensation for the reduction of emis-
sions.
   Only the proposals by the EU and Japan were truly comprehensive. India 
was in reality concerned with detail under the assumption that developed 
countries would be able to reach an accord, The British intention of the text 
tabled jointly by London and Washington was to induce the US to make a 
minimum commitment concerning emission control. Neither the EU nor Japan 
was able to mobilize sufficient influence to be able to perform as leaders. 
Specifically, they could not change the US recalcitrance regarding emissions of 
greenhouse gases.
   At the last session of INC in New York in the Spring of 1992, elected 
conference officers seemingly provided the necessary tactical leadership to 
finalize bargaining on the final text, the draft Framework Agreement. An 
Extended Bureau was set up temporarily consisting of conference and working 
group chairs as well as a few selected delegation. An extraordinary inter-
sessional meeting in Paris, the Extended Bureau, managed to find a way to 
eliminate most of the remaining sticking points. A critical element was that the 
Chair of INC-with great difficulty-was able to produce general approval for a 
new US-British comprehensive text including a minimal commitment for 
emission control. The acceptance of this text paved the way for the Framework 
Agreement.
   The INC process dealing with formula was significantly influenced by 
external forces. For example, both developed and developing countries strived 
to build up a common position by activities outside the process, for example in 
the OECD, in the context of the Economic Summit or at ad hoc conferences. 
There was seemingly also some influence from UNCED because this regime-
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building effort increased the cost of failure in INC. However, the strongest and 
crucial influence came from IPCC. The start of INC had provided the skeleton of 
a formula and hence partly reduced formula-negotiation in INC to negotiation-
on-detail.
Third Window of Analysis : Negotiation on detail 
   Like in most multilateral talks negotiation on detail in the Uruguay Round 
may be characterized as "editing diplomacy". When this process stage began 
bargaining was focused on draft texts pertaining to the various topics dealt with 
in the Negotiation Groups but also to a Final Text embracing the entire result of 
the Uruguay Round. In most interventions spokespersons for individual states, 
or of a coalition, wanted to safeguard a special interest by proposing or 
supporting a particular formulation pertaining to a specific element of the draft 
text. However, in some sensitive areas like, for instance, agriculture, discussion 
of details partly concealed the continuing conflicts of interest between the Great 
Powers. The dialogue between the Economic Great Powers (European Union, 
Japan and the United States), concerning politically important questions, was to 
a large extent handled outside the formal Uruguay Round institutions.
   Within the formal institutions the bargaining process was closely monitored 
by the Chairs of Negotiation Bodies and continuously supported by the GATT 
Secretariat. For instance, the Chairs tried to organize consultations in such a 
way that controversial points could be systematically eliminated. The Secre-
tariat summarized discussions, supplied requested information and continuously 
updated the texts under negotiations. Negotiation Groups reported to the major 
negotiation bodies, called Councils, which had a responsibility to package and 
integrate the results emerging in the various issue areas. Without Secretariat 
support or the carefully organized meeting format bargaining on derail would 
have been very hard to conclude in the multilateral trade talks of the Uruguay 
Round.
   Formal management and technical support of bargaining on detail did not 
represent sufficient leadership to bring the Uruguay negotiations to a complete 
end at the Brussels Ministerial Meeting in December 1990. This aim was 
prescribed in the formal plan for the negotiations which had been accepted by all 
parties. Therefore, the time table put pressure on negotiating parties. Initially, 
the Brussels meeting was meant to have a ceremonial character but in reality it 
became a forum for endgame bargaining. Although negotiations in Brussels 
were conducted in earnest at the highest political level and noteworthy progress
141
Gunnar Sjostedt
was made in some areas, several of the remaining sticking points could not be 
resolved. Thus the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels ended in failure. It had been 
impossible to produce a comprehensive agreement.
   However, new consultations restarted in early 1991, organized and led by 
the GATT Secretariat and its Director-General in spite of bad prospects for 
success. The motive was that accepted failure of a GATT round was believed to 
seriously threaten the credibility of the trade regime and, hence, the stability of 
the entire trading system. Thus, the GATT Secretariat provided the necessary 
leadership to keep the Uruguay Round on the rails after the Brussels Meeting. 
No single country or coalition of states was able or willing to shoulder the 
responsibility of a leader at this point. Nevertheless, the GATT leadership was 
not adequate to produce an agreement, or even to get serious bargaining under 
way. The conclusion of negotiation on detail was blocked by serious political 
contention. For example, several important developing countries remained 
opposed to the notion of bringing the so-called new trade issues into the GATT 
regime. The main political difficulty was, however, the discord between the US 
and the EC that was particularly visible and strong in the area of agriculture but 
which also blocked progress in other issue areas. In the previous multilateral 
trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the EU-US contention had a 
positive impact and produced significant direction to the negotiation. Once the 
two economic Great Powers had reached an agreement on a particular issue in 
the bargaining on detail other participants become increasingly pressed to make 
a final commitment as well. In the Uruguay Round EU-US contention did not 
produce this sort of leadership effect as the two parties were not able to reach an 
agreement between themselves on several significant issues. 
   In the area of Climate Change the Framework Agreement of 1992 includes, 
and formalizes, a formula for future regime-building negotiations. This agreed 
formula describes the problem area and indicates the solution to be negotiated, 
emission reduction and sink enhancement. The formula was acknowledged, and 
later repeated and reinforced at the meeting with the Parties to the Framework 
Convention which took place in Berlin in 1985. The next step in the negotiation, 
moving the process towards bargaining on detail, would be to specify commit-
ments regarding the reduction of C02 emissions into the atmosphere (quantities, 
time schedules etc. ).
   From a technical point of view the step 
commitment and detail could be uncomplicated 
to the way in which the formula was produced,
from formula to bargaining on 
an  straightforward. This is due 
based on careful scientific work
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at the international level combined with organized communication with policy 
makers in key countries with the help of scientific networks ("epistemic 
communities") but particularly through IPCC and its channels to INC, the 
negotiating body. This procedure had several important advantages. The issue 
description was very clear, detailed and authoritative as it was backed up by 
comprehensive scientific investigations by the world, scientific community. 
This clarification had causes, consequences and suitable, effective counter-
measures.
   The IPCC leadership in the formula negotiation has, however, caused 
problems for transition from formula to detail. These difficulties are essentially 
of two kinds. First, the formula does not coherently consider various political 
issues. There dose, for example, the questions about the distribution of 
responsibility for existing concentrations greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
financial compensation to developing countries, and trade-offs related to 
emissions and sinks. Second, the formula does not represent sufficient under-
pinning political power. 
BEHAVIORAL MANIFESTATIONS OF LEADERSHIP IN MULTILATERAL 
NEGOTIATION 
   The Uruguay Round as well as the Climate negotiations had a great number 
of participants. The climate talks at IPCC, INC and UNCEZI had several 
thousand participate. However, most of these states and organizations had a 
very peripheral or even entirely passive role. For example, most of the thirty 
international organizations that were invited to participate in the Uruguay 
Round were observers or made an occasional statement. Many nations in both 
the Uruguay and the Climate negotiations were followers, observers or simply 
nominal participants. The dynamics of the process of negotiation can in both 
cases be derived from the interaction of about 30 or 40 actors, states and 
organizations. Thus, in a very general sense these central actors can be 
attributed a share of a leadership role. 
   However, leadership in a more specific meaning is associated with a few 
patterns of performance ; coalition-building, comprehensive issue presentation, 
identification of joint interests, process management and process control.
   1.) Coalition-building. It may be argued that the essence of leadership in a 
multilateral negotiation is activities leading to the formation of coalitions. The 
process includes a number of major decision points. Choices have to be made on 
principal issue like whether negotiations should be started, what issues should 
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be covered, what framework should be used for analysis and problems-solving 
or whether a draft for final agreement is acceptable or not. A major task of a 
leader of a multilateral process is to see that there is a sufficiently strong 
coalition in favor of propositions that move the negotiation forward or bring it 
to an end. This kind of coalition-building can take many forms. It may, for 
instance, represent lobbying to secure a majority-or consensus-for a par-
ticular formal decision, or the purpose may be to create a grand coalition that 
will take some responsibility for the whole process. One example would be the 
Groupe de la Paix which was created by a number of Middle Powers towards the 
end of the Uruguay Round when the conflict of interests between the US and the 
EU threatened to paralyze negotiations.
   2.) Comprehensive issue presentation. Like many other contemporary 
negotiations the Uruguay round as well as the Climate negotiations were 
characterized by a high degree of complexity. One reason was the intricacy of 
the issues and another was the great number of nations, and therefore also of 
interests, involved in the process. Other explanations were the technical 
difficulty of the issues at hand, uncertainty with regard to crucial causal 
relationships or the lack of relevant knowledge on the part of many countries. 
Hence, before serious pre-negotiations had begun with regard to Climate 
Warming the awareness of this problem was very low in many countries, 
Concerning some issue areas the situation was quite similar in the Uruguay 
Round. For example, during the early pre-negotiation stage, US representatives 
argued for the inclusion of trade-related intellectual property rights into the 
agenda few governments were aware of their own national problems regarding 
"pirated goods" and related subjects. Therefore, in this kind of negotiation a 
crucial leadership task is to inform negotiation parties, or prospective 
participants, about the issues and their general significance. Once a negotiation 
has started and an organization has been established, agenda information may 
be distributed in different ways, for example, by an international Secretariat or 
by a special institution such as the IPCC in the Climate negotiations. Under 
these conditions standard Operating procedures may be employed. A much 
more demanding, and crucial, task is to offer a comprehensive issue presentation 
at the beginning of the negotiation when governments and other actors have to 
be convinced about the need to start new negotiations. Such information 
requires intensive communication between sender and receiver, as well as the 
capacity of the sender to fully understand the information needs of the receiver 
and respond to them effectively.
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   3.) Identification of joint interests. In order to influence other countries 
significantly comprehensive issue presentation often needs to be combined with a 
description of the joint interests served, or the collective goods that would be the 
result of a successful multilateral negotiations on the proposed agenda. In the 
case of the Uruguay Round the determination of joint interests was typically 
made in terms of the allegedly, generally valid doctrine-or theory-of free 
trade. However, for many countries an abstract presentation of the expected 
benefits of free trade did not automatically provide satisfactory motives for the 
participation in a new round of negotiation. Convincing argumentation pre-
supposed a certain knowledge and understanding about the position and 
political difficulties of the particular country concerned. Again this required 
fairly intensive communication with flexible possibilities for constructive 
feedback from targeted countries.
   4.) Process management. Multilateral talks on complex and technically 
difficult topics like international trade or climate warming requires a fairly 
developed institutional framework to allow negotiating between parties. 
Furthermore, negotiations require organizational support of various kinds like, 
for instance, the provision of secretarial staff to Negotiation Groups providing 
necessary documentation or supplying records from meetings. Thus, to some 
extent process management may be provided by the institutional machinery set 
up to assist a particular negotiation, However, it can also be anticipated that 
such formal organization of process management would be rather rigid without 
the capacity to respond flexibly and creatively to specified queries of individual 
countries.
   5.) Process control. The development of a multilateral process concerning 
the negotiation of complex, as well as politically controversially issues, will 
inevitably be steered by its own inherent logic, at least to some extent. For 
example, the intricacy of issues will require extensive room and resources for 
issue clarification and technical problem-solving. An established formula may 
be prerequisite for conclusive negotiations on detail. The participation of a 
multitude of countries with differing interests and capabilities is likely to create 
a need for some sort of formal negotiation institution including a plan of work 
and a time table. The Chairs of Negotiation Groups and other bodies provide 
certain leadership by organizing negotiation in line with the agreed plan of 
work. The Chair may also influence process development in a positive way by 
organizing informal meetings on tricky issues with particularly interested 
parties. The skill of the Chair may sometimes determine whether a particular
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meeting, or a work period for a Negotiating Group, is concluded successfully or 
not. However, ultimately the elected formal Officers of negotiation bodies are 
dependent on the political will of negotiating parties to work out an agreement 
or to establish a consensus regarding a proposal. Formal Chairs should be 
regarded as facilitator of a negotiation rather than genuine leaders. They can 
clarify sticking points, define common ground between opposing parties and 
indicate compromise solutions to conflicts of interest. But the Chair is in no 
position to put pressure on parties to make them accept a proposal. Neither can 
they bring radically new proposals but are constrained by parameters and 
restrictions that negotiating parties have established. Therefore, ultimately 
critical process control in a multilateral negotiations can only be exercised by 
one or more of the parties themselves taking on a leadership role. The typical 
method of this kind of leadership-bringing "political energy" into the process-is 
that a nation presents comprehensive proposals concerning the issue(s) currently 
at stake which frame the exchanges of parties and give them direction. Such 
leading papers typically generate submissions tabled by other parties, and may 
include additional suggestions, general comments, expressions of support or 
counterproposals. The issues at stake may be of various kinds such as the 
understanding of the problem at hand, a conceptual framework for issue analysis 
or a plan for the exchange of offers and requests.
   6.) Endgame dominance. In a multilateral process the endgame tends to 
develop a character of crisis management. Typically a number of minor issues 
remains unsolved when the negotiations approaches its prescribed termination 
date. Some of these topics may, however, represent highly politically sensitive 
matters which are of such a nature that they can only be solved at the very end 
of the negotiation process. In the GATT several of these problematic endgame 
topics have concerned the conflict of interest between the economic Great 
Powers, especially the EU and the US. An unresolved issue concerning the EU 
and the US blocks a final agreement in the GATT/WTO. At the same time the 
bilateral dialogue between the US and the EU is a strong determinant of when 
and how the multilateral process is to be terminated.
CONDITIONS FOR A LEADERSKIP ROLE
   The ultimate question addressed in this study is whether the leadership of 
one single, hegemonic state is necessary to reach a meaningful agreement in a 
complex multilateral negotiation. The assessment of the cases studied, the 
Uruguay Round and the Climate negotiations, does not offer any obvious
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answers to this query. It is clear that in both cases the process suffered from a 
lack of leadership and the "braker" role performed by the United States during a 
considerable part of the negotiations. Both the Uruguay and the Climate 
negotiations remained deadlocked for long periods of time. At the same time, 
neither process ended in failure. In the Climate talks parties have not made any 
binding commitments to reduce the emission of C02 and other greenhouse gases, 
but the 1992 Framework is, no doubt, a solid platform for future negotiation. 
Regime-building concerning other environmental issues have also started with 
the establishment of a framework for future negotiations. The success story 
regarding ozone depletion is one example. In that case the original framework 
was seemingly weaker than the Climate Framework agreement. The Marrakesh 
Agreement terminating the Uruguay Round was very difficult to reach but once 
established it was heralded as the most far-reaching extension of the 
international trade regime after the establishment of GATT after World War II.
   In the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1964-1967) the 
United States had acted consistently as a leader from the start to the end of the 
process. In neither the Uruguay Round nor in the Climate negotiations did any 
single actor provide this kind of continuous leadership. However, leadership was 
furnished to some extent at least some of the time in both processes, although by 
different actors, in different ways and with a varying degree of effectiveness.
   The research objective of the case studies reported above has been to 
analyze what kind of actions represent leadership and what the basic require-
ments are for undertaking such action.
   The above analysis of the Uruguay Round and the Climate negotiations 
indicate that leadership in a multilateral process is based on roughly five sub-
roles, or patterns of performance ; coalition-building, comprehensive issue 
presentation, determination of joint/common interests, process management, 
process control, trade and coercion (see Figure 1). To some extent, the sub-roles 
may be substitutes for one another at a given point of time. For example, a Great 
Power may choose to put pressure (coercion) on a number of other countries 
sequentially instead of trying to demonstrate the collective/joint gains 
associated with a given proposal at a meeting of a negotiating committee. 
However, the sub-roles also respond to different needs emerging in a 
negotiation. Such needs may, in turn, also be associated with a particular phase 
of the process. Hence, trading offers and requests typically pertains to the later 
stages of the process and the endgame. In contrast, comprehensive issue
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presentation is likely to be in demand in the process stage of agenda-setting and 
issue clarification. 
   Figure 1 includes a number of hypotheses about the conditions that a state 
or organization wanting to perform as a leader in a multilateral context will have 
to meet. These hypotheses address the question : What is the necessary power 
base for a multilateral leadership role ? The case analysis indicates that the 
power base consists of layers. One layer is closely tied the process of negotiation ; 
these are called competence/resources in Figure 1. The second layer is issue-
specific power. The third layer, finally, pertains to general structural power and is 
referred to as status in Figure 1. 
   Four types of process-related competence/resources have been tentatively 
identified : 
   Diplomatic competence represent the combination quality and quantity with 
regard to the human and other resources directly available in a country for 
foreign policy action, particularly negotiation with other nations. Administrative 
resources includes various kind of back-up and support facilities related to 
foreign policy action directly available to a nation's government and its central 
authorities. Procedural prerogatives, potentially conditioning leadership action in 
a multilateral negotiation, is essentially of two kinds : formal assignment (e. g. 
chairperson or rapporteur) given to a national delegate or the formal task and 
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competence of international organizations being involved in the process. 
Superior knowledge represents access to scarce information (e. g. statistics or 
technical expertise) needed for the negotiation or the capacity (e. g. an advanced 
national, scientific community) to produce, interpret or frame such information.
   Issue-specific power stems from the control of the values at stake in a 
negotiation, or other kind of power game. In a classic study Norwegian analyst 
Olav Knudsen demonstrated that in the negotiations at the so-called Liner 
Conferences about international shipping the issue-specific power of a nation 
was indicated by the amount of tonnage that it controlled. According to 
Knudsen the distribution of issue-specific power explained why a small country 
like Norway was one the most influential countries in the shipping negotiations 
(Knudsen, 1973). In the GATT/WTO talks the control of trade flows (e. g. 
measured as share of world exports) is a likely indicator of issue-specific power. 
In the Climate negotiations "the total emissions of greenhouse gases" is possibly 
the corresponding measure.
   When a country possess a certain minimum share of the total distribution of 
issue-specific power, this represents exceptional significance which, in turn, is a 
likely necessary, positive condition for a leadership role. Exceptional significance 
means that if a country, or possibly a coalition of states, is excluded from an 
agreement, this accord is of little value for other countries. A classical example 
of manifest exceptional significance taken from the trade area is the episode when 
the 1947 Havana treaty concerning the creation of an international trade 
organization suddenly lost all its earlier significance when the US Senate refused 
to ratify it. In the current negotiations on Climate Change a similar situation 
prevails, although so far it has been more inconclusive. The similarity is, 
however, that a great number of countries are unwilling to make binding 
commitments to an agreement to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases which 
may not include the United States.
   It is conceivable that more than one country may be of exceptional 
significance in the same multilateral negotiation. For example, in the 
multilateral trade talks it seems that the US, the EU and Japan are all of 
exceptional importance. An agreement in WTO excluding any of these three 
parties is simply not feasible and in this sense inconceivable. Various groupings 
of states are also likely candidates for exceptional significance in WTO, for 
example the large coalition of free trading agricultural exporters. A united 
Group of 77 also has a potential to block negotiation in WTO. The situation is
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similar in the negotiations on Climate Change. The economic Great Powers are 
of exceptional significance, and possibly a few other countries as well. 
   It is, however, easier to block a negotiation than to lead it. Superior issue-
specific power may be a prerequisite for a leadership role but it does not 
represent a sufficient condition for it. 
   Structural power is essentially a function of the possession of a military ca-
pability. The (Neo) Realist proposition about structural power is unconditional ; 
it is supposed to be valid for all sorts of state interaction in all sorts of situations. 
The implication is that military strength is a key determinant also of the 
outcome of multilateral negotiation. Examples of such cases are not difficult to 
find. Here belong, for example, such talks about borders, territory or other hard 
security issues for which war is a realistic alternative to negotiation. Military 
capability presumably also gives leverage to a party of a negotiation concerning 
disarmament or other military issues. It is, however doubtful if military strength 
breeds effective influence in negotiations on non-military issues regarding 
conflicts of interest in which the use of force is either excessively costly or 
simply not instrumental. In such cases issue-specific power is evidently of a 
much greater importance as a source of influence than general structural power. 
However, it cannot be excluded that structural power does have some 
significance also in negotiation on trade and environmental issues. The 
hypothesis implied in Figure 1 is that structural power is associated with the 
status of a nation, which influences how other actors perceive and treat it. Hence, 
an improving status is believed to breed attention and respect from other 
countries.
   The cases of trade and climate negotiation indicate that under some 
conditions a particular sub-leadership role may be bolstered by a particular 
competence or resource in Figure 1. For example, the superior knowledge of IPCC 
was evidently sufficient to accomplish comprehensive issue presentation in the 
climate talks. Likewise procedural prerogatives made it possible for the GATT 
Secretariat to relaunch the Uruguay negotiations after the failure of the 1990 
Ministerial Meeting in Brussels. 
   Such simple couplings between a particular pattern of leader performance 
and power base element seemingly opens the way for a variety of actors to 
perform a constrained leadership role in multilateral processes, which is 
restricted to a particular situation or phase of a negotiation. For example, 
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international organizations may have a superior knowledge, like the IPCC has 
had in the climate negotiation. An actor-state or organization-with a 
constrained leadership capacity is not able to move the process forward for long 
time, but there is a possibility that a distribution of work may be established 
with other actors endowed with a leadership capacity, that is constrained in 
another way. 
   However, the role analysis also indicates that the constraints are formidable 
for actors aspiring for a leadership role. The following circumstances make it 
difficult for actors that are not complete Great Powers to exercise leadership : 
1. Usually, the effective performance of a given pattern of leadership seems to 
   often require a combination of several competencies/resources at the same 
   time (e. g. diplomatic competence/superior knowledge for the determination 
  of joint interests). 
2. Often a particular pattern of performance needs to become combined with 
   another leadership sub-rule ; one lesson from the climate case is that a 
   problem definition based on superior-scientific-knowledge may represent 
   a sufficient motive to begin prenegotiation, or even real negotiations. But it 
   needs to be combined with the determination of critical joint interests if a 
   politically feasible negotiation is to be produced in the process. 
3. Process control, which is very demanding, is necessary to break an impasse 
   or to move the negotiation from one stage to another, e. g. from formula to 
   detail. It seems that process control to a great extent depends on issue-
   specific power, perhaps underpinned by structural power. 
   Thus, the present study has not been able to answer the question : what 
countries or coalitions will be able perform as leaders in future multilateral 
negotiations. One conclusion is, however, that concepts like structural and 
issue-specific power will have to remain in the analysis of leadership require-
ments. Another conclusion is in order to gain a radically better understanding of 
the leadership issue a process perspective will be necessary. In that connection 
the role analysis approach looks promising.
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